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The Evolution of the Iowa
Precinct Caucuses
HUGH WINEBRENNER
IOWA'S emergence as a weather vane in presidential politics is a
recent development. Prior to 1972, the Iowa caucuses were just
another electoral event in the middle of the national caucus and
primary schedule. When the Iowa Democratic party decided to
schedule their caucuses in January rather than March or April,
they began a chain of events which resulted in the caucuses
becoming a national phenomenon.
' The Iowa caucuses have evolved from the early scandal-
plagued days of the nineteenth century to their present position
of national prominence. In those early days, small groups of in-
dividuals attempted to control the local parties by limiting par-
ticipation in the caucuses. Throughout the early twentieth cen-
tury various state legislatures enacted measures which brought
the previously unregulated caucuses under the rule of law. In
the last decade the Iowa Republican and Democratic parties
made a number of changes in the conduct of the caucuses which
eventually brought them national media attention far in excess
of what might be expected for state parties electing so few
delegates to their respective national conventions.
Theoretically, the caucus and convention system begins
The author would like to thank Richard Schulze of the State Law Library
for his research assistance on the Code of Iowa.
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with precinct caucuses open to all party voters. The local
caucuses elect delegates to county conventions which, in turn,
elect delegates to district and state conventions where the
delegates to the national party conventions are selected. The
system is a product of Jacksonian democracy of the early 1830s
which, by 1840, had replaced the congressional and legislative
caucuses as the method of nominating public officials in the
United States. Since it "was neither recognized nor regulated by
law," party bosses gained control of the system during the latter
half of the nineteenth century.^
Iowa joined the Union in 1846 and the state's political par-
ties immediately adopted the national practice of a caucus and
convention system. As in other states, charges of manipulation
soon emerged. Emory H. English, in an excellent article on
voting practices in Iowa, outlines a number of common caucus
abuses. Generally, cliques or special-interest groups dominated
within party organizations and did their best to limit participa-
tion by opposing factions or the general public. The times and
locations of caucuses often were closely guarded secrets, and
"snap" caucuses were a favorite device of those "in the know."
The knowledgeable would assemble on short notice, elect a slate
of delegates to the county convention, and quickly adjourn.
When outsiders knew caucus times, a caucus might be packed
with supporters of a particular candidate or slate of delegates,
or a "competing event" might be organized. English recounts an
example of a "competing event" held in northern Iowa in which
"the 'fortunate' burning of an old shed in the outskirts of a small
town at exactly the advertised hour . . . of the caucus at-
tracted nine-tenths of the people of the village, including
members of the volunteer fire department. In the meantime,
those in the 'know' assembled at the caucus . . . , selected a
'slate' of delegates without opposition and adjourned."^
Frequent abuses of the caucus process led to calls for
reform, but the Iowa General Assembly acted slowly: The first
1. Frank E. Horack, "Primary Elections in Iowa," in Applied History,
Iowa Applied History Series, vol. 1 (Iowa City, 1912), 266.
2. Emory H. English, "Evolution in Iowa Voting Practices," Annals of
Iowa 29 (April 1948), 257.
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reform bill was not introduced until 1896. Reformers focused on
developing a system of primary elections in Iowa rather than
taking the less radical step of revising the caucus and conven-
tion system. Three reform bills were introduced and rejected by
the 26th General Assembly in 1896, but in 1898 the 27th General
Assembly enacted a "voluntary" primary election law for coun-
ties. The first "compulsory" primary election law passed the 30th
General Assembly in 1904, but it applied to counties with
populations in excess of 75,000 people and Polk was the only
county affected.^
In 1907, eleven years of reform efforts in the General
Assembly culminated with the passage of a statewide primary
election law. The law provided for primary elections to
nominate candidates for any office filled by direct popular vote
in the general election with the exception of judges. It also re-
quired that delegates to the party county conventions, members
of the county central committees, and presidential and vice-
presidential electors be nominated by primary election. Finally,
it required a preference poll for United States senators who at
that time were chosen by the state legislature. Since the 1907
law only affected offices filled by direct popular vote, it did not
provide for the nomination of presidential candidates.
Moreover, the district and state conventions, not popular vote,
still selected candidates to the national presidential conventions.
The 1907 law, however, did represent a major change in Iowa
electoral politics since it opened the previously closed party
system to the voters and limited party control over the
nominating process.^
Although amended several times, the 1907 law remained
substantially intact until 1963. There were, however, changes in
1913 and 1917 worthy of examination. In those years Iowa ini-
tiated, and then abolished, a presidential primary election.
In 1913 the 35th General Assembly amended Iowa's
3. James J. Crossley, 'The Regulation of Primary Elections by Law," ¡owa
Journal of History and Politics 1 (April 1903), 174-5; Iowa, Acts and Resolu-
tions, 27th General Assembly, 1898, Chap. I l l , 59; Iowa Acts and Resolu-
tions, 30th General Assembly, 1904, Chap. 40, 29.
4. Iowa, Acts and Resolutions, 32nd General Assembly, 1907, Chap. 51,
51.
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primary election law to include the selection of delegates and
alternate delegates to national conventions of all political par-
ties, the selection of national committee members for each par-
ty, and a presidential preference poll "for the purpose of ascer-
taining the sentiment of voters of the state in the respective par-
ties as to candidates for president and vice-president of the
United States."^
Iowa held its only presidential primary election on April
10, 1916, with mixed results. None of the major presidential
candidates entered the primary and less than one-third of the
eligible electorate voted. The primary election process cost the
state $122,000. Governor George W. Clarke, who, in his in-
augural address of January 16, 1913, had called for the passage
of a presidential preference primary law, now branded the 1916
presidential preference poll a farce. In his final biennial message
to the General Assembly in 1917, he urged the repeal of the en-
tire direct primary law and called for the return to the caucus
and convention system of selecting candidates for public office.*
The 37th General Assembly was not willing to abolish the
direct primary law in its entirety, but did agree with Governor
Clarke's assessment of the presidential preference primary elec-
tion. A bill to repeal this section unanimously passed both
houses in early 1917 and the newly inaugurated governor,
William G. Harding, signed it into law on February 16, 1917.^
The next major modification of the caucus and convention
system occurred in 1963 when the General Assembly amended
Iowa's primary election law and returned the selection of county
convention delegates to the precinct caucuses. Two years later,
lawmakers also removed the selection of party county commit-
5. Iowa, Acts and Joint Resolutions. 35th General Assembly, 1913,
Chap. I l l , 99.
6. Steven E. Schier, The Rules of the Game: Democratic National Con-
vention Delegate Selection in Iowa and Wisconsin (Washington, D.C, 1980),
58, fn 49; Des Moines Register, 30 January 1917, 2; Iowa, Inaugural Address
of Governor George W. Clarke to the Thirty-Fifth General Assembly. 16
January 1913, 19-20; Iowa, Biennial Message of Governor George W. Clarke
to the Thirty-Seventh General Assembly. 9 January 1917, 27.
7. Iowa, Acts and Joint Resolutions. 37th General Assembly, 1917,
Chap. 14, 32.
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tee members from electoral politics and provided for their selec-
tion at precinct caucuses. Several factors contributed to these
changes including the high cost of printing separate ballots for
each precinct, the low visibility of party offices, and a move-
ment in Iowa for a shorter ballot.* No additional substantive
changes to the Iowa primary law occurred after 1965. The cur-
rent law requires primary elections to nominate candidates for
all elective officials below the office of president with the excep-
tion of judges, and provides for a caucus and convention system
for selecting delegates to the presidential conventions.
When the General Assembly returned Iowa to the caucus
and convention system for selecting delegates and committee
members, it placed the caucuses on sound statutory footing.
Iowa law provides that "delegates to county conventions of
political parties and party committee members shall be elected
at precinct caucuses not later than the second Monday in
February on each even-numbered year."'
The actual date for precinct caucuses is set by the state cen-
tral committee of each party, and since 1976 the Republican and
Democratic parties have held their caucuses on the same day.
The principal motivation for this unusual example of party
cooperation in Iowa is to gain maximum media exposure, and in
that regard they have succeeded.i° The state central committee
determines a uniform starting time for all Democratic caucuses.
The county central committees control the starting time for
Republican caucuses in each county, which results in some
variation in the evening starting times. Iowa law also requires
that "the date, time, and place of each precinct caucus of a
political party shall be published at least twice . . . not more
8. Iowa, Acts and Joint Resolutions, 60th General Assembly, 1963,
Chap. 78, 117; Iowa, Acts and Joint Resolutions, 61st General Assembly,
1965, Chap. 89, 158; interview with Clifton Larson, former chairman, Iowa
Democratic Party, 23 February 1981.
9. Iowa Code, Sec. 43.4.
10. Interview with Tim Hyde, 8 October 1982. Hyde, former executive
director of the Republican Party of Iowa, provided two additional reasons for
the Republicans' willingness to initiate a common caucus date: to maximize
caucus participation through joint announcements and to prevent people from
participating in both the Republican and Democratic caucuses.
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than thirty days and not less than five days before the date of
the caucuses." In addition the notice must state in substance that
each voter affiliated with the specified political party may at-
tend the precinct caucus. Finally, whenever possible, precinct
caucuses are to be held in publicly owned buildings or in places
used for holding public meetings."
The requirements are intended to ensure an open and well
publicized caucus process and have succeeded in eliminating
most of the earlier abuses. It is still possible, however, to pack a
caucus with supporters of a particular candidate or slate of
delegates, but greater media coverage and the correspondingly
higher salience of the caucuses make the use of this tactic in-
creasingly difficult, especially in presidential election years.
The legislation of 1965 also determined rules of eligibility
for caucus ' participation. The law requires that caucus par-
ticipants reside within the precinct and that they are or will be
eligible electors by the next general election. The law permits
seventeen-year-olds who will be eighteen by the time of the
general election to participate in the caucuses. Since the precinct
caucuses are party-sponsored events, the parties can have, and
each has, additional requirements for participation. Neither
party requires that participants be registered to vote, but the
Iowa Republican party requires that participants "declare"
themselves Republicans and authorizes the resolution of
eligibility disputes at caucuses by majority vote. The
Democratic party limits participation to those who are "sup-
porters of the purpose of the Democratic party and are not
members of any other political party." Although the goal of
these requirements is to prevent raiding, it is very unlikely that
persons willing to "declare" themselves supporters of the party
on the evening of the caucus will be prevented from par-
ticipating by either party.^^
Voting procedures within caucuses are at the discretion of
each caucus gathering, although the Republican State Central
11. Iowa, Code, Sec. 43.92, Sec. 43.93.
12. Ibid., Sec. 43.90; Republican Party of Iowa, "Suggested Procedure
for Precinct Caucuses, January 21, 1980," mimeographed (Des Moines, 1980);
Iowa Democratic Party, "Precinct Caucus Kit, 1980," mimeographed (Des
Moines, 1980).
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Committee suggests votes be taken by secret ballot. Moreover,
any questions not covered in state law or by party rules are
resolved by majority vote of the caucus voters.
IHE PRINCIPAL CONCERNS of the precinct caucuses are delegate
selection and the development of issues for the party platforms,
but the parties vary somewhat in their conduct of business.
Both normally elect two precinct committee members to repre-
sent their precinct on the county central committees. Each
begins the platform-building process by developing and discuss-
ing issues which are then forwarded to the county platform
committees. Republican caucuses "take stands" and Democrats
"prioritize" the issues. The Democratic caucuses elect members
and alternates to serve on the Platform Committee and the
Committee on Committees planning the county conventions.
The Republican County Committees determine the procedures
for filling these positions and they vary by county. The
foremost concern of the party caucuses is the election of
delegates to their respective county conventions, and in
presidential years. Democratic and Republican procedures dif-
fer significantly.
The Democrats practice a system of proportional represen-
tation: Delegates to the county conventions are elected in pro-
portion to the levels of support for presidential candidates in
each caucus. There may be, and usually is, an uncommitted
group. A candidate preference or uncommitted group is viable
— eligible to elect delegates to the county convention — only if it
includes a minimum of 15 percent of the total caucus voters. If
more than 85 percent of those voting at a caucus support one
presidential candidate, or are uncommitted, they are entitled to
elect the entire slate of delegates to the county convention."
Delegate selection at Democratic caucuses is a multi-step
process with opportunities for bargaining and politicking at
each stage. After the chair determines the number of eligible
13. The 15 percent rule applies to caucuses electing four or more
delegates. The minimum figures for viability in caucuses electing fewer
delegates are: three delegates —16% percent, two delegates —25 percent, and
one delegate —50 percent plus one.
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voting members in attendance, caucus participants divide into
presidential preference groups. When that stage is completed,
groups are counted for purposes of determining viability, and
preference groups that fail to meet minimum viability standards
have the opportunity to reassociate with other groups. At this
point, politicking increases in intensity as viable groups seek to
proselytize the "groupless" voters in order to increase the
number of delegates for which they qualify. When all voters are
members of a viable candidate preference or uncommitted
group, the caucus chair again counts the groups and determines
the number of delegates to the county convention which each is
entitled to elect. The chair informs county headquarters of the
number of delegates committed to each candidate, as well as the
number selected as uncommitted, and the final step of delegate
selection begins. Delegate selection within groups is usually a
lively and spirited process which frequently involves
speechmaking, bargaining, and vote trading.
Party officials claim that the system of proportional
representation makes it possible to project the number of
delegates that each Democratic presidential candidate will have
among those ultimately comprising the Iowa delegation to the
national convention. In 1972, Iowa Democratic officials
responded to national media requests for "results" of the caucus
process by preparing a list of sample precincts for purposes of
projecting statewide caucus candidate support. In 1976, under
State Chairman Tom Whitney, the Democrats established a
"caucus returns headquarters" at the Des Moines Hilton with a
phone reporting system by party chairs from Iowa's ninety-nine
counties. A party staffer was present and provided immediate
analysis of support patterns from around the state. The enter-
prising Whitney charged all present ten dollars for the service."
The projections resulting from these Democratic efforts are
highly tentative since some delegates are selected as "uncommit-
ted," none is legally bound at succeeding steps in the process,
and possibly, indeed probably, one or more of the presidential
hopefuls will drop out of the race prior to the county conven-
tions leading to realignments of delegates previously supporting
14. Schier, Rules of the Game, 145, 316.
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those candidacies. The 1976 and 1980 caucuses provide in-
teresting contrasts as to the accuracy of national convention
delegate strength projections based on caucus outcomes. The
1976 projection indicated that Jimmy Carter would control 13 of
Iowa's 47 national convention delegates, Morris Udall 3, others
13, and "uncommitted" 18. On the first ballot, Iowa's delegates
gave Carter 25 votes, Udall 20, Jerry Brown 1, and Ted Ken-
nedy 1, which certainly calls the accuracy of the caucus projec-
tions into question. In 1980, with an incumbent president and
fewer candidates for the nomination, the projections of future
delegate strength proved to be very accurate. Democratic of-
ficials projected that the Iowa delegation would include 31
Carter supporters, 16 Kennedy, and 5 uncommitted delegates.
The totals of those ultimately selected, and bound by the 1980
national convention rules, were Carter 31, Kennedy 19, and 2
uncommitted.^^
The Republican delegate selection process in presidential
caucus years is less complex than the Democrats' system. The
Republicans generally select their delegates on an "at large"
basis, although individual caucuses determine their selection
procedures, and should they desire, elect delegates on a propor-
tional basis. A precinct electing six delegates at large would
allow each caucus participant to vote for as many as six
delegates, and the persons receiving the most votes are elected
regardless of their presidential preference. A well organized can-
didate organization possibly could pack a caucus and with a
simple majority control all the delegates elected, a feat requiring
85 percent at Democratic caucuses. The Republican delegate
selection process probably leads to the selection of more party
regulars to the county convention than the proportional system
used by the Democrats.
The Republican at-large system does not lend itself to pro-
jecting the composition of the delegation to the national con-
vention. In response to media pressure for concrete outcomes
from the caucus process and the desire to maximize the atten-
tion given to the Iowa caucuses, the Iowa Republicans initiated
15. Interview with Marie Menne, former caucus chairperson, Iowa
Democratic Party, 23 February 1981.
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a presidential preference poll in 1976. Beginning modestly,
sixty-two scientifically selected precincts conducted the poll; by
1980, all caucuses did so.
The poll occurs prior to the delegate selection process, but
there is no requirement that delegates elected later in the eve-
ning reflect the sentiments expressed by the poll. Delegates are
not committed or bound to any candidate. Consequently, the
poll has little scientific basis for predicting candidate support
among the Iowa delegation to the Republican National Conven-
tion. Republican officials, however, note that in 1976 the poll
predicted very accurately the breakdown within the delegation
to the national convention. In that year, the poll results in-
dicated that 45.3 percent of those attending Republican
caucuses supported President Gerald Ford, 42.5 percent favored
Ronald Reagan, and 10.6 percent were undecided. The Iowa
delegation split 19 for Ford and 17 for Reagan on the first ballot
at the convention. In 1980 the poll was a complete failure as a
predictor. George Bush was favored by 32 percent of the caucus
participants, Ronald Reagan by 30 percent, and several other
candidates divided the remaining votes. The Bush advantage in-
creased at the county conventions, but by the national conven-
tion, Reagan supporters were in complete control of the Iowa
delegation and cast a unanimous vote for Reagan.
a position of relative obscurity, the Iowa precinct
caucuses moved toward national prominence in 1972 when the
Iowa Democratic Party moved its caucus date forward to
January 24, making it the first primary event in the nation. The
early date for the caucuses is the result of an interesting series of
events. The Iowa General Assembly first passed legislation
governing the date of precinct caucuses in 1969. The law re-
quired that caucuses be held "not later than [the] second Mon-
day in May in each election year," but did not limit how early
they might be held. Prior to 1972, the Iowa parties tended to
hold their precinct caucuses in late March or in April, which fell
in the middle of the national primary schedule. The Democratic
National Committee prompted the move by deciding to hold its
national convention on July 9, 1972, which was somewhat
earlier than usual. The Iowa Democratic Party constitution in-
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eluded a clause requiring thirty days between party functions
(precinct caucuses, county conventions, congressional district
conventions, the state statutory convention, the state presiden-
tial convention, and the national convention), and due to the
early date for the national convention, the latest possible date
for the caucuses in 1972 was January 24. The January date
moved the Iowa Democratic Party caucuses ahead of the New
Hampshire primary election which was traditionally the
nation's first primary event.i*
The thirty-days-between-events clause in the party con-
stitution arose from practical rather than philosophical con-
siderations. According to Cliff Larson, Democratic state chair
from 1970 to 1973, the party wanted to include as many
Democrats as possible in the caucus process and to provide
delegates to the next set of party functions with good sources of
information. Unfortunately, the state party headquarters had
severe physical limitations and very poor office equipment, so
to complete the paper work and arrangements required for each
level of meetings, a month interlude between party functions
was necessary. Larson maintains there was no political intent in
moving the caucus date forward, and confesses that he was
unaware the Iowa Democratic caucuses would be the nation s
first as a result of the move. He hastens to add, however, that it
did not take Iowa Democrats long to realize what they had
done, and although surprised by the magnitude of the media at-
tention, the Iowa Democratic Party set out to capitalize on its
new position of prominence.^^
The early date for the Iowa precinct caucuses changed their
character completely. Prior to 1972, they attracted no national
attention. Generally, caucus attendance was poor, and often a
handful of party regulars were the only persons present. Thus,
even though the meetings were open and the Iowa press and
other media publicized them extensively, party regulars
dominated the precinct caucuses and the candidate selection
16. Iowa, Acts and Joint Resolutions, 63rd General Assembly, 1969,
Chap. 90, 124; James Flansburg, "Iowa Caucus Date is First," Des Moines
Register, 21 November 1971, Sec. B, 1.
17. Interview with Clifton Larson.
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process. Although empirical evidence is not available, probably
many party regulars were happy with limited public participa-
tion.
Being the first primary event brought the Iowa Democratic
caucuses to the attention of Democratic presidential candidates
as well as to the media. When the major Democratic hopefuls
campaigned extensively in the state in 1972, increased attention
given the caucuses by the candidates and media stimulated
voter participation: Turnout for the Democratic caucuses in-
creased from 38,000 in 1968 to 60,000 people in 1972.1»
The caucuses received an immediate boost in media atten-
tion when the McGovern campaign decided to make a major
effort in the state. Muskie also campaigned in Iowa in 1972. The
prominence of being first, and frequent visits by the major
Democratic candidates, focused a great deal of media attention
on the precinct caucuses.
The national attention in 1972 prompted the parties to take
steps to further expand interest in, and publicity for, the Iowa
caucuses. The Republicans, who missed out on the headlines in
1972 by holding their caucuses in April, were anxious to share
the limelight with the Democrats. Both parties realized the
necessity of a common caucus date to maximize media
coverage. The two parties successfully negotiated an agreement
to hold the Republican and Democratic caucuses in 1976 on
January 19, and have continued the practice of a common date
since that time. The Republicans also initiated a presidential poll
in 1976.1«
The common date for the Republican and Democratic
caucuses in 1976 set the stage for a real media event and Iowa's
party leaders were not disappointed. Jimmy Carter targeted
Iowa as a testing ground for his campaign and Ronald Reagan
challenged President Gerald Ford in the state. The candidates
and media representatives visited the state in large numbers and
Iowa's caucuses gloried in national attention. Surprisingly, par-
18. Levels of participation are very rough estimates by state party of-
ficials and should be treated carefully.
19. Interview with Steve Roberts, former chairman. Republican Party of
Iowa, 25 March 1981.
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ticipation in the caucuses was low in 1976. Party officials
estimate that 4 percent (22,000 to 26,000) of the registered
Republicans and 7 percent (38,500) of the eligible Democrats at-
tended. The success of the Carter campaign, and the credit
given the Iowa caucuses for his good start virtually guaranteed
greater media attention for the 1980 Iowa caucuses.
Yet, not everyone was pleased with the consequences of the
early caucuses. In late 1977, the Democratic National Commit-
tee, concerned about the length and cost of a primary and
caucus process that was over five months in duration, began
examining alternatives to the drawn out process. When Iowa
legislators learned that compression of the primary schedule
was a possibility, they reacted to the perceived threat to their
now famous caucuses by enacting legislation on March 31,
1978, which required precinct caucuses to be held no later than
the second Monday in February in even-numbered years. The
Democratic National Committee ultimately included in its pro-
cedures for the 1980 National Convention a rule (number 10) re-
quiring caucuses or primaries to be held between the second
Tuesday in March and the second Tuesday in June, but included
an appeal process for states who had held caucuses or primaries
earlier in 1976.2°
In 1979, Iowa Democrats requested a variance to Rule 10,
and after demonstrating that they attempted without success to
persuade the Iowa General Assembly to change the caucus law
and permit a date which fell within the March to June
Democratic National Committee guidelines, received permis-
sion to conduct their precinct caucuses in January again.^ ^
Thé candidates and media arrived in Iowa in late 1979 in
prepa/ation for the 1980 precinct caucuses. The early date of the
Iowa/caucuses had the effect of moving the entire national
caucus and primary process forward, thus lengthening the cam-
paign and increasing the costs to candidates. Although cam-
20. Iowa, Acts and Joint Resolutions, 67th General Assembly, 1978,
Chap. 1042, 207; Democratic National Committee, "Delegate Selection Rules
for the 1980 Democratic National Convention," mimeographed (Washington,
D.C., June 9, 1978), 10.
21. Interview with Marie Menne.
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paign expenses, and particularly media costs, are relatively low
in Iowa, success in a caucus state is largely dependent on good
grass-roots organizing. The successful 1980 campaigns of Jimmy
Carter and George Bush again demonstrated this in Iowa. Both
spent months putting together their organizations. John Con-
nally, on the other hand, had little or no organization in Iowa
and invested heavily in television time with few positive
results. ^ ^
Media coverage of the precinct caucuses was immense. On
Iowa caucus night in 1980, all three network national news pro-
grams originated from Des Moines. Democratic party leaders
estimate media expenditures of over $3.5 million to cover the
Iowa caucuses, with over two hundred national press people on
hand."
The early and sustained attention given the caucuses
stimulated interest and officials reported record voter participa-
tion throughout the state. The Republican poll indicated that
106,000 persons participated, and the Democrats estimated that
100,000 people attended their meetings. The large turnout
included many political amateurs attending their first caucus
and some of the usually well-orchestrated events degenerated
into rather chaotic affairs. Organizational efforts faltered as
meetings spilled over into second and third rooms and supplies
ranging from registration forms to ballots were in short supply.
The results of large-scale citizen participation in the caucuses
produced mixed results. Many meetings elected persons attend-
ing their first caucus as delegates to county conventions, and
others were at best examples of symbolic democracy as citizens
unfamiliar with caucus procedure had little impact. An inter-
esting example of the latter occurred in Republican Caucus 74 in
Des Moines, where 474 people attended and participated in the
straw poll, but upon completion of the poll approxi-
mately half of those present left before the real business of
delegate selection took place.^*
After the 1980 caucuses and primaries, the Democratic par-
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Interview with Scott Bittick, caucus member, 23 January 1980.
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ty's National Rules Committee made another move to compress
the caucus and primary schedule at a meeting on July 9, 1980.
The committee defeated by an 80 to 55 margin an effort to force
all precinct caucuses and primary elections into a fourteen-week
period between the first Tuesday in March and the second Tues-
day in June. They did approve, however, a resolution asking
the party's national executive committee to study the length of
the presidential selection process.^^
The Democratic National Committee responded to that
recommendation by appointing the Commission on Presidential
Nominations (called the Hunt Commission after its chair. North
Carolina Governor James Hunt) to consider a number of
changes in the nominating process. Their report, dated January
15, 1982, included a recommendation that the length of the
Democratic primary season be compressed into a thirteen-week
period between the second Tuesday in March and the second
Tuesday in June. In deference to Iowa and New Hampshire,
they granted permanent exemptions from the time limits for the
Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary election,
although both must be held later than in 1980: Iowa may hold
its Democratic caucuses no earlier than fifteen days before the
start of the thirteen-week period and New Hampshire seven
days. The exception will give Iowa and New Hampshire the op-
portunity to focus national attention on their primary events as
in the past, but may lessen the long-term impact, as candidates
will have the opportunity to tumble more quickly from victories
(or rebound more quickly from defeats) in Iowa and New
Hampshire.^* Due to the widespread national attention, the
Iowa caucuses have an impact on presidential races far beyond
their real significance. Iowa is a small, homogeneous mid-
western farming state of small towns and rural areas. In 1980,
only 123 of Iowa's municipalities had populations in excess of
2,500 people, 17 cities exceeded 25,000 persons, and Des
Moines, the largest city in the state, had fewer than 200,000
25. Larry Frühling, "Move to Push Back Iowa's January Caucuses is
Killed," Des Moines Register, 10 July 1980, 1.
26. The Democratic National Committee accepted the Hunt Com-
mission's recommendations on March 26, 1982.
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residents. The state's 1980 population of 2,913,808 was 97 per-
cent white. It sent fifty delegates to the Democratic National
Convention and thirty-seven to the Republican Convention in
1980 which was 1.5 percent and 1.9 percent of the total at the
respective conventions. Participation in the caucuses is typically
less than 10 percent of the electorate, although it grew to about
20 percent in 1980 which was comparable to the turnout for the
New Hampshire primary election. Iowa has eight electoral
votes. Party competition in Iowa is high, but in presidential
elections the state supported the Republican candidate in seven
of the last nine races, the exceptions being 1948 and 1964.
Although no state legitimately can claim to mirror the na-
tional electorate, Iowa is less representative than many. Larger
states legitimately complain that Iowa influences the candidate
selection process far more than it should given its lack of
demographic and political representativeness. There is a certain
irony in the Iowa caucuses twice playing a major role in the
nomination of Jimmy Carter and then supporting Gerald Ford
and Ronald Reagan in the 1976 and 1980 presidential races.
Perhaps more important in placing the Iowa caucuses in
perspective is the fact that the "results" have little meaning. As
previously noted, the caucuses are the first in a multi-step pro-
cess and the delegates selected at those meetings are not bound
to support a particular candidate at the county conventions, nor
are delegates from the county to the state conventions bound.
(A Hunt Commission recommendation also accepted by the
Democratic National Committee at its March 26, 1982, meeting
will abolish the 1980 Democratic party practice of binding state
delegates at the national convention.) As the field of presiden-
tial candidates narrows and as the political process is played out
at the county, district, and state conventions, there is always
fluctuation in candidate support. Projecting levels of delegate
strength — referred to as "national delegate equivalents" by state
party officials and the national media —after the first step in a
fluid multi-step process is untenable. The "national delegate
equivalents" are little more than guesses.
Even so, as long as the Iowa precinct caucuses are the
earliest event in the primary season, they undoubtedly will at-
tract a great deal of national attention. It matters little that the
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"results" of the Iowa caucuses are meaningless as predictors of
delegate preference within the Iowa delegations to the national
conventions. They are significant because they are first and the
national media choose to assign importance to them. Media in-
terpretation of caucus "outcomes" in Iowa is crucial to the cam-
paigns of presidential aspirants. The broad coverage of the
media advances the campaigns of the "winners" by featuring
them on the evening news, the front pages of newspapers, and
on the covers of national magazines. They also make it difficult
for the less fortunate candidates, branding them "also rans" or
"losers." The winners experience renewed vigor in their cam-
paigns and increased success in fund-raising efforts, while the
losers' campaigns are set back and they find it more difficult to
raise money. In 1976 for example, R. W. Apple of the New York
Times in a post-caucus story headline declared that "Carter is
Regarded as Getting Big Gains From Iowa Results," an inter-
pretation that "was prevalent on major networks and in major
newspapers."^'' The CBS Morning News of January 20, 1976,
declared Carter the victor and conducted a rather lengthy inter-
view with him in which they permitted Carter to interpret the
impact of the caucuses on his and the other candidates' cam-
paigns. The only other candidate shown during the program
was Fred Harris, and he was represented as having finished a
poor third. The Washington Star declared Udall's campaign
"damaged" on the basis of his fifth-place finish in Iowa with only
5.8 percent of the caucus vote.^* Yet, at the Democratic Na-
tional Convention in 1976 Carter, the media winner, received 25
votes and Udall, the loser, 20 votes on the first ballot.
In 1980, the Iowa caucuses provided a tremendous boost to
the. candidacy of George Bush who shaded the front-runner and
heavily favored Ronald Reagan in the Republican poll by a
margin of 32 to 30 percent. The media trumpeted his "victory"
around the nation. Reagan underestimated the importance of
Iowa and chose not to devote his personal energy to campaign-
ing in the state. Bush's star rose dramatically after the victory in
27. R. W. Apple, New York Times, 20 January 1976, quoted in Schier,
Rules of the Came, 336.
28. Schier, Rules of the Came, 336.
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Iowa, and he rode the momentum all the way to the Republican
vice-presidential nomination.
The national media and officials of both state parties
cooperated in selling the caucuses as a weathervane in the
presidential selection process. The actions taken by the
Democrats in 1972 and 1976 and by Republicans in 1976 and
1980 made possible a media event by providing ''results" or "out-
comes" of the caucuses, even though the "results" are of little
scientific value and actually may be very misleading.
The 1984 caucuses will again be the first event in the na-
tional primary season and will be conducted under the
microscope of the media. Presidential candidates will be in Iowa
very early, and large sums of money will be expended by the
candidates and the media. The national attention tends to in-
crease participation in the caucus process, and state officials of
both parties are pleased to be able to identify potential sources
of party support nine or ten months prior to the November elec-
tions. Because of the media attention, the Iowa local meetings
which were designed to generate platform issues and select
delegates to the county conventions will make or break
presidential candidacies and must be taken seriously by all
presidential candidates.
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